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We analyze the interrelation between monetary stability and financial structure in 20 Sub-Saharan
economies. Using a panel data set we estimate the impact of monetary stability and financial development
on income per capita. Special interest is given to the conditions of the so-called CFA-countries, that have a
fixed exchange rate vis-à-vis the French franc. Is the impact of the financial system development in these
countries bigger than in non-CFA countries? We measure monetary uncertainty using an auxiliary
(G)ARCH model of monthly inflation. For financial development we take both the role of M2 as credit to
the private sector into account. Our sample covers the years 1970-1997. We estimate growth regressions in
three different forms: cross-section, interval, and a pooled model. We do find that inflationary uncertainty
is relevant for growth of GDP per capita. Financial development is relevant in the low data-frequency
models. The differences between CFA and non-CFA countries become apparent in the interval and pooled
models. CFA-countries seem to rely more on credit in the interval model. Moreover, in the years 1985-
1993 non-CFA countries seemed to suffer more from inflationary uncertainty.
(also downloadable) in electronic version: http://som.rug.nl/
2 
With the introduction of the single currency in a large part of Europe the theory of optimum
currency areas seems to have attracted its recognition. The participants in the Economic and
Monetary Union in Europe not only hope to benefit from the short-run reduction of exchange rate
volatility, but also strive for higher levels of economic welfare in the long run. Trade integration
and an optimal allocation of resources seem to be the cornerstones of the road to a higher income
per head in the future. It is not widely known that similar thoughts have been put forward in
Africa more than 50 years ago. Both trade and monetary integration are subjects that attracted
attention of almost all African policy makers. Indeed, the expected payoffs of these policies seem
to be relatively higher in developing economies. In this paper we address the topic of economic
development in its relation to monetary and financial development in 20 African economies in the
past three decades. Half of our sample countries is currently a member of one of the two African
monetary unions that compose the so-called CFA-zone. Since we have long-run evidence for
these countries we are able to answer the question whether an increase in monetary stability really
leads to more welfare. We think that membership in a currency union may instill policy discipline
and give a country a level of credibility among its citizens and outside investors that outweighs
any negative economic effects from the loss of the nominal exchange rate as an adjustment tool.
For the CFA-countries is export growth crucial for economic growth. A stable currency facilitates
and gives the zone policy credibility in international circles. Not only provides a currency union a
level of credibility, but a link with France ensures the availability of the markets of the EMU to
franc zone exports. Another effect of the CFA franc zone is the stimulation of regional
investments. Due to elimination of (a large part of) exchange rate risk for international investors
and a low inflation rate, investments in the CFA franc zone are relatively save. This may reduce
the interest rate (because of a lower risk premium) and therefore could stimulate investments and
economic activity.
In this paper we relate economic and financial development. Financial development stretches out
from the monetary circumstances to the provision of liquidity and credit. These are two lines of
the literature. First we discuss the relation between economic growth and inflation, after that we
concentrate on the relation between growth and financial structure.
Today’s conventional wisdom says that, at business-cycle frequencies, inflation and growth may be
positively related, while that relationship should be negative for the medium and long run.1 The
direction of long-run causality normally considered is that running from the distortive effects of high
                                                          
1Theories a la Tobin and Sidrausky suggest a positive effect from permanently higher inflation on growth coming from the
real interest rate effect on wealth allocation.  The opposite prediction comes from recent growth models with cash-in-
advance requirements for investment, which would imply that inflation would act like a tax on investment and lead to
negative growth effects of steady-state inflation, implying also that the loss of output from an inflation crisis will be
permanent.
3inflation and resulting high variability in relative prices to lower growth.  Lower growth could occur
either via a lowering of total productivity, or through the depressing effect of uncertainty on
investment, or through the adverse effect on efficiency of credit allocation. The distortive effects
should dominate any business-cycle relationship at high inflation levels and at long enough period
lengths. However, at lower inflation levels, the causality of the inflation-growth relationship is not so
obvious.  Supply shocks, positive or negative, could 	
 move growth and inflation in
opposite directions and could mask the more subtle distortive effects of low inflation. The theoretical
literature therefore points at the distinction between expected and unexpected inflation.
Up until the mid-1970s there was little empirical evidence for any relationship between inflation and
growth and in the economic development context there were even doubts about which way the
relationship should go. Fischer (1993) found stronger negative associations between inflation and
growth in cross-sectional and time series studies of a larger set of countries and a longer time span
(see also Barro, 1995). However, Levine and Zervos (1993) showed convincingly that the cross-
section correlation between inflation and growth depends on a few low-growth countries with
extreme inflation (in their sample, the influential points were Nicaragua and Uganda).
Next we turn to the second line of the literature relevant to our paper. There is a large literature on
the relation between economic performance and financial structure, the latter mostly defined by
the ratio of bank and public market finance. A majority of the attention goes to the role of banks
and credit supply. There are early advocates of either a positive or a negative influence of
financial intermediation. Hamilton (1781) and Bagehot (1873) argued that banks are crucial for
economic growth. Schumpeter (1911) suggests even a positive impact of the development of the
financial sector on both the level and the growth rate of per capita income. These studies give
support to the notion that a more developed financial system leads to a better allocation of
resources, better monitoring and less information asymmetries. There are also economists who
believe that financial development is just a side product of real development (Robinson, 1952). It
might even be so that better resource allocation leads to lower savings, which will slow down
economic growth (see King and Levine, 1993b).
This debate is hard to solve and causality is hard to pin down empirically. There is recent
evidence on the relation given by King and Levine (1993a, 1993b), Levine and Zervos (1998),
Rajan and Zingales (1999), Rousseau and Wachtel (1998), Levine, Loayza and Beck (1999).
These studies all point at a positive impact of (the exogenous component of) financial
intermediation on per capita growth.
All studies include at least some developed countries (and some of them also include developing
countries). There is no serious evidence for developing countries on this issue though. This paper
tries to fill at least part of this gap by analyzing Sub-Saharan economies. We have a simple
4argument to focus on these countries. Thirteen of the countries are members of the CFA franc
zone, some of them more than 50 years. These countries use a common currency, the CFA-franc,
that is freely convertible into French francs at a fixed rate. It is widely believed that these
economies benefited from the exchange rate stability as guaranteed by the CFA-system. Despite
serious problems at the end of the 1980’s and the beginning of the 1990’s the growth rate of the
CFA-economies is believed to be above the levels of the non-CFA African countries. This paper
tests whether monetary uncertainty, measured by inflationary uncertainty, and financial structure,
measured by monetization (M2) and credit to the private sector, affect CFA-economies
differently than non-CFA countries. We do not consider the discussion of financial structure, as
defined by the ratio of public versus private supply of capital, to be relevant for Africa since there
are no lively stock markets active in the countries and sample period under consideration.
Moreover, the recent literature on the relevance of the development of financial systems for
economic growth finds strong empirical support in favor of the so-called legal view (see for
instance Beck 	 2000, and Levine, 2000). According to the legal view it is the effectiveness
of legal institutions and the enforcement of legal rights that matter to the impact of financial
systems on economic growth. This emphasis on the legal environment of financial transactions
sets the legal view apart from the long-standing debate about the question which 	of financial
activity is alleged to foster economic growth (see Levine, 1997, for a survey of this debate).  So
instead of asking whether either bank-based or market-based systems are stimulating economic
growth, adherents of the legal view argue that for growth-enhancing contribution of any kind of
financial system, one should focus on the legal aspects of that system. The volume or depth of the
market for bank credit or the stock market as such is only of secondary importance. The empirical
validity of the legal view has been established for bank credit and economic growth (Levine,
1998) and for financial development in general and economic growth (Levine, 2000).
Our goal is to develop a simple model of per capita growth. We check the relevance of monetary
uncertainty and financial structure (and its interaction) for economic development. The next
section describes briefly the institutional arrangements and history of the CFA franc zone and
provides a review of recent research (see also Clément 	, 1996 and Mehran 	, 1998). Next
we present our approach to model inflationary uncertainty. We use monthly data to develop
unexpected inflation variances per country. Section 4 gives the growth regressions. We perform
three different methods to analyze our topic. We employ a cross-section analysis, an analysis
using five-year averages, and an analysis based on pooled data. Since the literature is not
conclusive on the appropriateness of either method we propose to use them all. We discuss the
use of instruments in accounting measurement errors and endogeneity problems. Section 5
concludes.
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	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More than any other continent Africa has been experimenting with economic integration. For
more than a half-century various groupings of countries emerged and collapsed. At the moment
eleven economic blocks are seeking to resolve trade and monetary problems. For the perspective
of this paper two monetary blocks are prominent:
• West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU), consisting of Benin, Burkina Faso,
Cote d’Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau2, Mali, Niger, Senegal and Togo.
• Central African Economic and Monetary Community (CAEMC), consisting of Cameroon,
Chad, Congo, Central African Republic, Equatorial Guinea and Gabon.
These blocks form the CFA franc zone. In this section we provide general information about the
franc zone. First we discuss the institutional arrangements of the franc zone, because these are
quite unique. Next we will discuss the history of the CFA franc zone. Especially the
developments in the 1980s, which led to the devaluation in January 1994, are described. Third,




The CFA franc zone is administered by two central banks, one for each monetary union (see also
Hallerberg and Özden, 2000). The 								(BCEAO)
serves as the common central bank for the WAEMU, and the 	 	  	 	
		(BEAC) serves as the common central bank for the CAEMC. Each central bank issues a
version of the CFA franc3. The parity of both versions was constant from 1948 until January
1994; 50 CFA francs to one French franc. On 12 January 1994, after much debate and years of
economic hardship, the CFA franc was devalued; the parity is now 100 CFA francs to one French
franc.
The zone functions under a number of key operating principles:
• A fixed parity against the French franc, adjustable if required by economic reasons after
consultation with the French government and unanimous decision of all member countries
within each monetary union.
• The CFA franc is fully convertible into the French franc and, with some exchange
restrictions, into other currencies. Convertibility is guaranteed through an agreement with the
French government. Under this agreement, each central bank has a so-called operations
account with its foreign exchange reserves at the French Treasury and there is an overdraft
facility provided at market-related interest rates in case of need.
                                                          
2
 Guinea-Bissau joined the WAEMU in 1997.
3
 Communauté Financière Africaine in the WAEMU and Coopération Financière en Afrique Centrale in the
CAEMC.
6• Free movement of capital within the zone, including to and from France.
There are a number of operating rules stipulated in the statutes of the two central banks to
preserve these principles (and as a means of encouraging financial discipline). These rules require
that each central bank:
• Maintain at least 65 percent of its foreign assets in the operations account with the French
Treasury.
• Maintain a foreign exchange cover of at least 20 percent of their sight liabilities. If the
balance of foreign reserves held at the operations account is less than 20 percent of direct
claimable obligations for a period of 3 months end, the African central banks have to take
measures to limit the supply of credit. The African countries are obliged to pay the following
interest rates if their balance on the operations account is negative:
- Deficit between 0-5 million FF: 1%
- Deficit between 5-10 million FF: 2%
- Deficit bigger than 10 million FF: the average interest on short-term Treasury issues.
In turn pays the French Ministry of Finance interest equal to the average interest on short-
term Treasury issues if the operations account shows a surplus above 10 million FF.
• Limits its credit to each government of member countries to a ceiling equivalent to 20 percent
of that country’s government revenue in the previous year.
Because of the pooling of the foreign currencies on each of the two operations account it is
possible for countries with a positive balance of payments to compensate those countries with a
negative balance of payments. Furthermore, because of the existence of the operations account,
no CFA country will ever lack foreign exchange, as long as the balance on the operations account
(summing the balances of each country) is positive, because under these conditions, convertibility
is guaranteed. Devarajan and de Melo (1987, 1991) point out that this is especially important for
developing countries, who are often forced in a what they call stop-go policy (restricting resp.
stimulating demand) depending on availability of foreign exchange.
" $

Until 1985 the CFA franc served its members well assuring remarkably low rates of inflation,
reasonable and sometimes high economic growth as well as a reasonable high rate of (foreign)
investment. After 1985, however, the economic and financial situation of the zone deteriorated as
a consequence of two major shocks. First, the zone’s terms of trade deteriorated by about 50
percent during the second half of the 1980s, owing mainly to a sharp drop in world market prices
for its major exports commodities (cocoa, coffee, cotton and petroleum in particular). Second, the
external competitiveness of the zone weakened as a result of the marked appreciation of the
French franc against the currencies of the zone’s other major trading partners and a lack of
7appropriate response by CFA franc zone members to this appreciation. Since 1986 France fixed
its currency to the German mark within the framework of the EMS. This was a totally different
exchange rate policy from that of the early ‘80s. In those years the French franc devaluated
several times in an effort to improve the competitiveness of France. This change in policy
occurred at the same time as the start of the spectacular fall of the US dollar. Because most of the
export prices of the CFA franc countries are expressed in US dollars, their export receipts
declined in terms of CFA francs. Finally, some neighboring countries as Ghana and Nigeria
(competitors on the world market) devalued their national currencies several times since 1986.
The resulting appreciation of the CFA franc caused a serious loss of competitiveness.
At the same time, the zone was increasingly handicapped by a number of structural and sectoral
rigidities, particularly high unit-labor costs. Despite repeated attempts at internal adjustment,
especially to rein in wage costs and restructure the banking systems and public enterprises, per
capita income fell steadily, and the economic and financial situation continued to worsen. For
many years, the World Bank and the IMF advocated a realignment of the CFA franc. Because of
social, political and economical reasons it lasted until 1994 before the CFA franc devalued and
the CFA countries ceased to rely exclusively on measures of internal adjustment. The exchange
rate realignment led to a significant turnaround in economic activity in the CFA franc zone, with
output, exports, and investment increasing rapidly during 1994-1997. Inflation, after a brief surge
in the aftermath of the devaluation, has returned to low levels.
Recently, the so-called Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) declared that
they intend to form a monetary union (among the WAEMU-countries plus Gambia, Ghana,
Guinea, Liberia, Nigeria and Sierra Leone) in 2004 (see Masson and Pattilo, 2000).4 The strive
for monetary stability and free trade is apparent in a couple of other organizations, like in the
recent revived East African Community (EAC), or the Common Market for Eastern and Southern
Africa (COMESA). Figure 1 gives an overview of current status of all African countries.
<Insert Figure 1 about here>
How do the various blocks perform? In this paper we focus on blocks mainly: the CAEMC, the
WAEMU, the non-WAEMU ECOWAS and the COMESA-group. Table 1 gives statistics for
those countries for GDP-growth, inflation and an indicator of financial development: credit to the
private sector as a percentage of GDP. We give data per country for two periods: 1970-1984 and
the more troublesome 1985-1998 period. Moreover, we plot the averages for the groups.
Table 1 reveals that the various blocks do not differ dramatically in GDP-growth rates. But there
is a difference between the monetary unions and the other two blocks if one sees the inflation
rates and the financial development indicators. Inflation in the non-monetary union countries is
typically higher, while financial development is lower on average.
                                                          
4
 Cap Verde is also a member of the ECOWAS-group, but links to the euro via Portugal.






The CFA franc zone has been subject of increasing interest to researchers over the past fifteen
years5. Boughton (1993) focuses on the relationship between economic performance, especially
the deterioration of economic conditions in the zone, and the institutional arrangements of the
zone. He argues that the institutional framework gave the zone a degree of discipline that led to
superior economic performance relative to other sub-Saharan countries outside the zone (at least
until the mid-1980s). Writing before the devaluation, he notes that the loss of the nominal
exchange rate as a policy tool placed a burden on the individual governments of the zone. This
exacerbated the problem of real exchange rate misalignment from the deteriorating terms of trade.
Devarajan and de Melo (1987, 1991) provide a mixed outlook on franc zone membership, based
on the zone’s historical growth performance. They test GNP growth between 1960 and 1982
relative to a set of comparator countries and find that CFA countries grew more slowly than other
developing countries throughout the world. When the comparator set is reduced to sub-Saharan
countries only however, the CFA countries relatively outperform their neighbors. The relative
performance of the CFA countries improved after 1973, but worsened after 1980.
Guillaumont, Guillaumont, and Plane (1988) present results from a complementary, but ‘more
complete and systematic’, study on growth in the franc zone relative to other developing
countries. They find that growth for CFA franc zone members compares favorably with other
developing countries throughout the world and is superior to a subset of sub-Saharan countries.
Conway and Greene (1993) come to the same conclusion.
Devarajan and Rodrik (1992) present an opposing view. They apply to the franc zone a
framework, which models the tradeoff of commitment to a fixed exchange rate with the loss of
the ability to adjust to terms of trade shocks. The authors find that the fixed exchange rate
resulted in lower inflation relative to other sub-Saharan countries. The loss in output stemming
from the inability to adjust the nominal exchange rate to respond to terms of trade shocks,
however, outweighed inflation gains, and they conclude that the franc zone would have been
better off in a system allowing more flexibility.
                                                          
5
 This coincides with the period in which the member countries of the zone began to experience the
deterioration in economic conditions, which led to the decision to devalue.
9Allechi and Niamky (1994) use a different approach but reach the same conclusion. Comparing
gains from pooled reserves against the opportunity costs of maintaining an operations account at
the French Treasury, the authors evaluate the net benefits of membership in the zone. They find
that more zone members were net losers than gainers over the period 1975 to 1988. This is
significant, since the sample period is mostly before the terms of trade downturns began to occur.
Clearly, there is no consensus on the merits of membership in the CFA franc zone. Before the
terms of trade shocks of the 1980s and early 1990s, there appeared to be ample evidence in favor
of membership. The evidence leading up to the 1994 devaluation, however, illustrate that this is
not a question with a simple answer.
% (	*	
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This study examines the impact of monetary uncertainty and financial structure on per capita
economic growth () for a group of African countries (see Table 2 for a full list of
countries). In our main analysis we use annual observations for our growth regression. For the
uncertainty measure we need annual information on volatility. In order to be able to model
monetary uncertainty we need a higher frequency of data to construct the volatility measure. To
that extent we use monthly data on inflation, money growth and relative changes of the nominal
exchange rate. We estimate a monthly model and use the variances from that model as a proxy for
uncertainty.  The empirical analysis refers to the period 1970-1997. As pointed out in the
previous section there seems to be split in economic development of the sub-Saharan countries
around 1985. In order to explore this, the total sample period is split into two periods (1970-1984
and 1985-1997) for a time series analysis of the data.
For each country and sub-period a measure of monetary uncertainty is needed. The uncertainty
measure is derived from information on the volatility of individual countries’ monthly inflation.
Inflationary uncertainty is known to be the number one representative of monetary uncertainty.
We follow the empirical uncertainty literature by deriving an uncertainty proxy from the
unpredicted part of a forecasting equation of inflation. The method starts by estimating a
forecasting equation to determine the expected part of inflation. We specify the forecasting
equation for each country  as follows:
 !"LW = βi,1  !"LW + βi,2 #LW + βi,3#LW$βi,4 d(log(LW))$εLW (1)
where  !"LW  represents the percentual rate of change of the Consumer Price Index of country  in
month , #LW represents the percentual rate of change of the money stock (M2) of country  in
month and LWthe nominal exchange rate (local currency per dollar). εLW  is a residual term which
might be nonnormally distributed (see hereafter). All data are from International Financial
10
Statistics of the IMF. The equation is estimated, for all countries individually, using data for the
January 1970 up to and including December 1997 period.
The next step is to derive the (monthly) measure of uncertainty by using the residuals from the
forecasting equation. Since inflation often displays volatility clustering, especially when inflation
is measured at such a high frequency, estimating the forecasting equation by the Ordinary Least
Squares (OLS) technique might not be appropriate. Therefore, before deriving the uncertainty
measure, we test whether an OLS estimate of the forecasting equation results in ARCH effects by
using a Lagrange multiplier (LM) test with three lags. This test suggests considerable ARCH
effects for a number of countries in the sample. For that reason, we estimate the forecasting
equation by one or another variant of an Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedastic (ARCH)
model of volatility. The ARCH approach comes down to jointly estimating a mean equation for
inflation and an additional equation for the conditional variance. For reasons of convenience, the
specification of the “forecasting” equation is the same for all countries (see Equation (1)).
The precise method we follow runs as follows. We start by estimating the OLS-version and test
for ARCH (using 3 lags, so one quarter). If there are no ARCH-effects we simply use the OLS-
model to compute the inflation residuals. If there are ARCH-effects we proceed and estimate an
(G)ARCH-specification and test for ARCH-effects again starting from the most general model
with 3 lags for the ARCH and 3 for the GARCH-specification. If we can reduce the lags we do
so, based on significance of the (G)ARCH-terms. If necessary we include either higher-order
ARCH or even GARCH. If the residual-test passes the hypothesis of absence of ARCH-effects
we use the final specification. Table 2 shows which technique is used for the different countries
in the two sub-samples. The table also shows the F-values for remaining ARCH effects, based on
the ARCH LM(3) test.
<Insert Table 2 about here>
We proxy the monthly inflationary uncertainty by the square root of the monthly conditional
variance. The final step is to derive an annual uncertainty proxy for the yearly data (%!).
This is simply done by taking the average monthly (conditional) standard deviation over the sub-
period. Table 3 presents the results.






In the previous section we discussed our approach to estimate unexpected inflation. We
constructed annual variances of the inflation forecasting equations. Next we use these estimates in
a model that explains economic growth. The intuition runs as follows. Unexpected inflation is
believed to be harmful to economic growth. Inflation variability correlates with the level of
inflation (see Barro, 1995). The higher the level of inflation the more variable the price level will
be. Especially investment is expected to suffer from uncertainty, although economic theory is not
conclusive on this topic. For instance in the case of perfect markets, risk neutral investors,
reversible investment decisions it can be shown that investment reacts positively to a higher
uncertainty of e.g. sales prices. Most of the empirical studies do find a negative sign of the
investment-uncertainty relation though (see Lensink 	, 2001). Countries that have been able to
reduce inflationary uncertainty are therefore believed to have shown a better investment
performance and probably through that a higher per capita growth rate.
We follow the literature and explain the development of income per head (see Barro and Sala-i-
Martin, 1995). There are three approaches found in the literature:
• Cross-section growth regressions. In these models the average growth over the sample period
is the focal variable in the analysis. The main argument to use a cross-section model is the
notion that cross-country variance is more important than time variance. Indeed, some
determinants of income per capita are rather constant through time. Think for instance of
enrolment data and other fixed determinants like geographical, legal, and societal data.
• Fixed-interval averages. In this class the entire sample is averaged in mostly five-year sub-
periods (see Islam, 1995). This avoids serious measurement and stationarity problems.
Moreover, this fixed-interval average method appeals to the nature of some data that have a
confident measurement twice in a decade.
• Panel regressions. In these models the mixture of both time and country variance is exploited.
The main advantage of this model type is the more appropriate treatment of dynamics. It
requires explanatory variables that indeed show variation over time. The main disadvantage
of this model type is that in some cases it is hard to treat time variation in an appropriate way.
It is likely that not all the variables have the same time series properties across countries.
Moreover, if a lagged dependent variable is included in the model, Instrumental Variables (or
Generalized Methods of Moments) should be used to correct for endogeneity of the
regressors. The selection of instruments is in most cases at least troublesome. Pritchett (2000)
argues that although we have learned some things from examining growth correlates with
multivariate regressions of various types, there is little more to be learned by moving to
panels. According to him this approach leads to lower power, greater measurement error bias,
12
confusion about causality and endogeneity, and dynamic misspecification of many stripes, all
of which cloud the interpretation of regressions using higher frequencies.
All the models and methods have arbitrary elements. The selection of countries, variables, and
years determines the outcomes to a large extent. Sala-I-Martin (1997) proposed a robust method
to correct for the selection of variables bias. In this so-called extreme bound analysis random
combinations of determinants are used and the final estimates are based on average outcomes.
Since our study explores the issue of monetary stability and financial development in 20 African




The first approach is the cross-section model, or simply the growth regression. This model reads
in its basic form as follows:
Log(&'()'()-Log(&'*	()'*	() = 1 Log(&'*	()'*	() + + + , + 	
Where & represents real GDP,  population, + a set of “normal” determinants of economic
growth, such as investment per GDP, government expenditure (possibly in various categories),
enrolment as a proxy of human capital, and , a set of additional determinants, for which a wide
range of options exists. The parameter  is of interest if one studies convergence of growth. In
our case we are not as such interested in convergence.
We construct averages of the data available over the years 1970-1997, and the two relevant
subsamples 1970-1984 and 1985-1997, and use the averages in the regressions.
We experimented with the following groups of variables (see Barro and Sala-I-Martin, 1995 for a
review):
• Base variables: Investment as a percentage of GDP, government consumption as a percentage
of GDP, trade as a percentage of GDP en gross primary enrolment;
• Geographical data: latitude, longitude, area of countries, and a dummy variable for oil
exporter or the country to be locked in by land;
• Legal data: a dummy variable that indicates British or French legal origin;
• Financial data: M2 as a percentage of GDP, Credit to the Private Sector (CPS) as a
percentage of GDP, inflation and our constructed inflationary uncertainty, and the Black
Market Premium. Moreover we constructed a dummy variable indicating whether a country is
a member of either the Western or Central African Economic And Monetary Union.
For the first group we find that only investment contributes significantly in any equation. From
the second group only longitude enters the equation in some cases, but not in a robust way. The
legal systems do not have a significant impact on the endogenous variable. Before entering the
13
class of financial variables our base model consists of the base-year GDP per capita and
investment only. Since we have a limited number of countries (19, since Ethiopia lacks data for
GDP per capita in 1970), we decide to proceed with this elementary base model.
The financial variables are correlated. So is inflation heavily correlated with its uncertainty
(partial correlation coefficient of 0.999).  This finding is consistent with the literature, where it is
shown that inflationary uncertainty is positively correlated with the level of inflation. M2 and
credit to the private sector (CPS) are also correlated (0.618). So we decide to include inflationary
uncertainty and one of M2 or CPS. Table 4 contains the results. Table 4 Panel A shows that
inflationary uncertainty (or inflation itself) has a negative impact on the growth rate of GDP per
capita for the whole period under consideration 1970-1997. The size of the monetary sector, as
measured by M2 has a clear positive impact on growth. Credit to the private sector is less
convincing. We also checked the interaction between inflationary uncertainty and M2 and CPS,
but did not find significant effects. The same holds for the Black Market Premium. Finally we
included a dummy variable for the countries that are a member of one of the monetary unions, but
did not find significant results. Next we re-estimated the model in cross-section form for two sub-
samples. The results are given in Table 4 Panel B and C. Panel B shows that in the first sub-
period 1970-1984 there is no impact of inflationary uncertainty or financial structure variables on
the growth rate of GDP per capita. Panel B shows that in 1985-1997 there is a negative impact of
inflationary uncertainty on growth. Moreover, the liquidity indicator M2/GDP has a clear positive
impact.
<Insert Table 4 about here>
+" ,	

Next we estimate the model in intervals. We take averages over 1970-1974, 1975-1979, 1980-
1984, 1985-1989, 1990-1994, 1995-1997. For these six periods we estimate the model with least
squares (we ignore the requirement to estimate the model with instruments in this version of the
paper; a similar argument is true for our panel regressions in Section 4.3). Table 5 gives the
results.
<Insert Table 5 about here>
Table 5 reveals that the cross section results also hold in the interval model. Investment still is an
important determinant. We also tested for the relevance of trade, government consumption, and
primary enrolment but none of these variables had additional explanatory power. As Table 5
shows the impact of inflationary uncertainty is now less convincing. The role of M2 and CPS
change as compared with the cross section analysis. In the cross section model M2 dominated
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CPS, but in this interval model CPS is more important. We also checked for the interaction
between inflationary uncertainty and CPS, but did not find significant results. Also the black
market premium did not add any additional information.
Next we estimate the same models for the countries that belong to the CFA-zone. Table 6 gives
the results. The results show that inflationary uncertainty is no longer important in these
countries. M2 is also unimportant, but the credit to the private sector is important.
<Insert Table 6 about here>
In order to assess the results we estimate the same models for the countries that are not a member
of one of the Economic and Monetary Unions. Table 7 gives the results. This table shows that
inflationary uncertainty is a bit more harmful to the non-monetary union countries. Moreover in
these economies M2 is of more importance than credit to the private sector.
<Insert Table 7 around here>
+"% &	

The third approach, pooled estimation, exploits both time and country variation of the data. We
first estimated the model that we have shown in the two previous subsections. Table 8 gives the
results. First we only include investment, next we include the variance of unexpected inflation
and the two financial quantity variables, M2 and CPS. As Table 8 shows the variance of
unexpected inflation does not contribute significantly in explaining the variance of the growth
rate of GDP per capita. Similar arguments hold for money and credit.
<Insert Table 8 about here>
Experimenting with the model shows that government consumption enters the model (with a
significant negative sign). So we proceed by including both investment and government
consumption as a percentage of GDP in the equations to be estimated.
We estimate the same model for the countries that are a member of a monetary union and the
countries that don’t belong to one of the unions. Tables 9 and 10 present the results. In general we
find that the financial quantity variables, money or credit, are insignificant in both sub-samples.
Inflationary variability matters in the monetary union estimation, while in the non-monetary
union group inflationary uncertainty is not significant. This result seems surprising. Inspection of
the data shows that for some non-monetary union countries, like Zaire, there are periods with
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excessive monetary uncertainty. These excessive periods disturb the assumption of a common
inflationary uncertainty parameter across the whole sample.
<Insert Tables 9 and 10 about here>
The pooled model also allows us to analyze the economies in sub-periods. As known the
troublesome years of the CFA-countries are from 1985 up to the devaluation in January 1994. It
is interesting to estimate our model using over this sub-period and the years before. So we
estimate the model with all the variables included (with CPS) for both 1971-1984 and 1985-1993
for the CFA and the Non-CFA groups. Table 11 gives the results. Table 11 shows that investment
was more important in the period 1970-1984 than in the years 1985-1993. Government
consumption had a significant negative impact on economic growth in the CFA-countries, but not
outside the CFA-group. Inflationary uncertainty has no impact before 1984, but for 1985-1993
there is a remarkable difference between the two groups. One can see that the CFA-economies
were not hindered by monetary uncertainty (on the contrary), but non-CFA economies were. The
role of credit is rather unimportant in all cases.




In this paper we analyze the impact of inflationary uncertainty and financial development on per
capita growth of GDP in 20 African economies. We distinguish two groups of countries:
countries that are a member of the CFA-zone (over two currency unions) and non-CFA countries.
Moreover we analyze two sub-periods: 1970-1984 and thereafter. Our main focus is on
inflationary uncertainty and financial development. Is a reduction of inflationary uncertainty
through monetary unification beneficial to economic growth?
Our main findings are as follows. First, we find that the investment to GDP ratio is the single
overall significant explanatory variable in any growth equation we estimated. Second, it depends
on the modelling method which of the other variables are found to be relevant. We analyzed three
types of models, cross section, interval, and pooled models. The cross section model indicates
that money (M2) is relevant for economic growth. However if we consider time variation to be
important, the role of M2 diminishes in an interval model and even vanishes in a pooled model.
For credit to the private sector a similar story holds. Credit to the private sector is important in the
interval model, but vanishes if the frequency of the data increases.
Inflationary uncertainty is proxied by subinterval estimation over 1970-1984 and 1985-1997. We
take into account that volatility might be clustered. The resulting variance of inflationary
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uncertainty is important in the cross-section and interval model. If we increase the frequency of
the data this robustness vanishes. In the pooled model we show that there is a rather different role
for inflationary uncertainty across the CFA and non-CFA economies in the troublesome period
1985-1993. It seems that despite a lower growth rate CFA countries did enjoy monetary stability.
The fixed exchange rate resulted in lower inflation relative to other sub-Saharan countries. But in
the 1985-1993 period, the loss in output stemming from the inability to adjust the nominal
exchange rate to respond to terms of trade shocks outweighed the inflation gains.
We find no evidence for an impressive role of financial development in explaining real growth.
But a similar argument holds for enrolment, trade shares, short-term debt, black market premia
and more variables that are normally found to be relevant in empirical growth equations. It is
therefore more interesting to explore the role of expected and unexpected inflation further in the
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Cameroon 7.32 0.20 10.96 6.35 22.62 17.41
Chad 0.52 4.25 20.25 5.08 10.92 8.04
Central African Republic 1.54 1.10 7.60 3.06 14.22 5.98
Congo, Rep. 8.43 0.56 9.30 8.11 17.54 14.83
Equatorial Guinea 12.97 14.71









Benin 3.03 3.50 11.26 20.04 16.83
Burkina Faso 3.06 3.96 4.85 3.70 12.69 12.96
Cote d’Ivoire 4.15 2.65 10.54 6.09 35.46 29.39
Guinea-Bissau 2.93 1.49 47.07 12.74
Mali 3.19 2.67 4.29 20.19 13.23
Niger 0.00 2.85 10.28 2.15 12.08 10.57
Senegal 2.62 3.08 10.22 4.10 31.16 24.45
Togo 2.66 2.40 9.61 5.19 20.61 22.42






Cape Verde 8.86 4.66 11.25 6.33 22.82
Gambia, The 4.86 3.00 10.17 12.06 18.86 12.05
Ghana 0.57 4.56 49.32 28.21 4.97 5.09
Guinea 4.20 4.24
Liberia 10.09 7.74
Nigeria 3.38 4.21 17.20 30.66 10.17 10.79






Angola 0.95 1.98 2189.43 4.16
Congo, Dem. Rep. 0.92 -2.76 43.33 2601.79 3.23 1.62
Eritrea 4.64
Ethiopia 2.17 2.73 8.56 6.58 8.50 11.63
Kenya 5.70 3.47 11.80 15.48 24.15 32.17
Malawi 4.62 3.53 13.79 25.82 13.85 8.68
Mauritius 5.20 6.11 12.70 7.13 21.81 38.81
Seychelles 5.62 4.62 13.16 1.52 19.16 12.96
Sudan 3.45 4.60 19.59 72.14 11.14 5.38
Uganda 2.70 5.49 56.20 66.31 6.01 4.06
Zambia 1.36 1.22 82.79 17.59 8.43
Zimbabwe 4.70 3.50 9.68 20.20 24.07 25.92




Notes for Table 1
Source of the data is the CD-ROM World Development Indicators 2000 of the Worldbank,
Washington DC. GDP represents the annual growth rates of real GDP, inflation is the annual
relative change of the Consumer Price Index, and Credit represents Credit to the Private Sector as
a percentage of GDP. All data are averages over the periods mentioned.
CAEMU: Central African Economic and Monetary Union;
WAEMU: Western African Economic and Monetary Union;
ECOWAS: Economic Community of West African States;








OLS- Method -value OLS- Method -value
CAEMC
Cameroon 1.44 0.16
Chad 4.63 GARCH(1,1) 0.27
Central African Republic 1.64
Congo 12.03 GARCH(2,1) 1.81 9.82 GARCH(2,1) 0.75
Gabon 2.59 GARCH(1,1) 0.17 8.37 GARCH(1,1) 1.74
WAEMU
Burkina Faso 2.86 GARCH(1,4) 1.74
Cote d’Ivoire 0.22 2.29 GARCH(1,1) 1.02
Niger 5.02 GARCH(1,2) 0.63 10.04 GARCH(1,1) 0.89
Senegal 10.88 GARCH(1,3) 0.37 0.87
Togo 1.35 2.27 GARCH(1,1) 1.61
ECOWAS
Gambia 0.48 10.12 ARCH(1) 0.74
Ghana 16.21 GARCH(1,1) 0.58 15.68 GARCH(1,1) 0.75
Nigeria 1.87 GARCH(1,1) 0.56 1.19
Sierra Leone 66.52 GARCH(3,3) 0.46
OTHER
Ethiopia 0.53 3.21 GARCH(1,1) 0.83
Kenya 0.32 4.83 GARCH(3,1) 0.35
Mauritania 1.51
Mauritius 1.41 GARCH(1,1) 0.38 5.56 GARCH(3,3) 0.86
Sudan 13.44 GARCH(1,1) 0.13 0.77
Zaire 25.4 GARCH(1,1) 0.06 9.59 ARCH(2) 1.79
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Notes for Table 2
The source of the data used is  	
"/6/ of the  	
#
	
" (CD ROM August 2000). Monthly data are used for Inflation, Money growth and the
Nominal Exchange rate (vis-à-vis the U.S. dollar). The model estimated is:
 !"LW = βi,1  !"LW + βi,2 #LW + βi,3#LW$βi,4 d(log(LW)) $εLW
where  !"LW  represents the percentual rate of change of the Consumer Price Index of country  in
month , #LW represents the percentual rate of change of the money stock (M2) of country  in
month and LWthe nominal exchange rate (local currency per dollar). εLW  is a residual term.
OLS-" = "-value of the LM(3) test for ARCH-effects;
"-value: "-value of the LM(3) test for ARCH-effects of the ARCH(x) or GARCH(y,z)-model.
CAEMU: Central African Economic and Monetary Union;
WAEMU: Western African Economic and Monetary Union;



































Notes for Table 3
Data represent the averages of annual standard deviations of the monthly residuals from the
OLS/ARCH/GARCH estimated models of inflation:
 !"LW = βi,1  !"LW + βi,2 #LW + βi,3#LW$βi,4 d(log(LW)) $εLW
where  !"LW  represents the percentual rate of change of the Consumer Price Index of country  in
month , #LW represents the percentual rate of change of the money stock (M2) of country  in
month and LWthe nominal exchange rate (local currency per dollar). εLW  is a residual term. See
Table 2 which model applies for what country.
CAEMU: Central African Economic and Monetary Union;
WAEMU: Western African Economic and Monetary Union;










The model estimated reads:
Log(Y(T)/P(T))-Log(Y(base)/P(base)) = a1 Log(Y(base)/P(base)) + a2 INV +a3Z+ e
where Y represents real GDP, P population, INV investment per GDP, and Z a set of additional
determinants: Variance of unexpected inflation (Var(INF)), Money per GDP (M2), and Credit to
the Private Sector as a percentage of GDP (CPS). e is a residual.
Panel A 1970-1997 (Base=1970, 19 countries)
log(Y(base)/P(base)) -0.173 -0.142 -0.216 -0.163
(0.04) (0.03) (0.038) (0.036)
INV 0.056 0.048 0.042 0.044
(0.013) (0.011) (0.006) (0.008)






R2 0.437 0.574 0.775 0.585
SSR 2.395 1.707 0.846 1.558
White-heteroskedasticity corrected standard errors are between parentheses. Number of countries
is 19 (Ethiopia lacks data for the base year). R2 represents the adjusted determination coefficient.
SSR is the sum of squared residuals.
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Panel B 1970-1984 (Base = 1970, 15 countries)
log(Y(base)/P(base)) -0.081 -0.070 -0.130 -0.095
(0.027) (0.034 (0.070) (0.062)
INV 0.028 0.027 0.031 0.029
(0.008) (0.008) (0.010) (0.009)






R2 0.358 0.416 0.427 0.377
SSR 1.341 1.101 0.908 0.988
Panel C 1985-1997 (Base = 1985, 20 countries)
log(Y(base)/P(base)) -0.095 -0.066 -0.095 -0.077
(0.045) (0.041) (0.031) (0.041)
INV 0.030 0.021 0.013 0.018
(0.016) (0.015) (0.010) (0.013)






R2 0.185 0.363 0.573 0.372





The model estimated reads:
Log(Y(T)/P(T))-Log(Y((-1))/P(-1)) = a1 Log(Y(-1)/P(-1))) + a2 INV + a3 Z+ e
where Y represents real GDP, P population, INV investment per GDP, and Z a set of additional
determinants: Variance of unexpected inflation (Var(INF)), Money per GDP (M2), and Credit to
the Private Sector as a percentage of GDP (CPS). e is a residual.
log(Y(-1)/P((-1)) -0.364 -0.378 -0.419 -0.473
(0.039) (0.042) (0.055) (0.033)
INV 0.01 0.01 0.011 0.044
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)






R2 0.809 0.808 0.762 0.898
SSR 0.737 0.588 0.57 0.536
The intervals are 1970-1974, 1975-1979, 1980-1984, 1985-1989, 1990-1994, 1995-1997. Data
are averaged over the intervals. The estimation method is weighted LS with Fixed Effects
estimates. The sample consists of 20 countries over 5 difference periods. Total number of
observations is 87. White-heteroskedasticity corrected standard errors are between parentheses.





The model estimated reads:
Log(Y(T)/P(T))-Log(Y((-1))/P(-1)) = a1 Log(Y(-1)/P(-1))) + a2 INV + a3 Z+ e
where Y represents real GDP, P population, INV investment per GDP, and Z a set of additional
determinants: Variance of unexpected inflation (Var(INF)), Money per GDP (M2), and Credit to
the Private Sector as a percentage of GDP (CPS). e is a residual.
log(Y(-1)/P(-1)) -0.466 -0.518 -0.529 -0.563
(0.083) (0.042) (0.107) (0.084)
INV 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)






R2 0.598 0.605 0.563 0.716
SSR 0.34 0.201 0.281 0.243
The intervals are 1970-1974, 1975-1979, 1980-1984, 1985-1989, 1990-1994, 1995-1997. Data
are averaged over the intervals. The estimation method is weighted LS with Fixed Effects
estimates. The sample consists of 10 countries (Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central African
Republic, Chad, Congo, Cote d’Ivoire, Gabon, Niger, Senegal, and Togo) over 5 difference
periods. Total number of observations is 45. White-heteroskedasticity corrected standard errors






The model estimated reads:
Log(Y(T)/P(T))-Log(Y((-1))/P(-1)) = a1 Log(Y(-1)/P(-1))) + a2 INV + a3 Z+ e
where Y represents real GDP, P population, INV investment per GDP, and Z a set of additional
determinants: Variance of unexpected inflation (Var(INF)), Money per GDP (M2), and Credit to
the Private Sector as a percentage of GDP (CPS). e is a residual.
log(Y(-1)/P(-1)) -0.237 -0.236 -0.268 -0.313
(0.058) (0.059) (0.052) (0.08)
INV 0.012 0.012 0.013 0.013
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)






R2 0.845 0.861 0.907 0.851
SSR 0.303 0.223 0.227 0.215
The intervals are 1970-1974, 1975-1979, 1980-1984, 1985-1989, 1990-1994, 1995-1997. Data
are averaged over the intervals. The estimation method is weighted LS with Fixed Effects
estimates. The sample consists of 10 countries (Ethiopia, Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, Mauritania,
Mauritius, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Sudan and Zaire) over 5 difference periods. Total number of
observations is 42. White-heteroskedasticity corrected standard errors are between parentheses.





The model estimated reads:
Log(Y(T)/P(T))-Log(Y((-1))/P(-1)) = a1 Log(Y(-1)/P(-1))) + a2 INV + a3 Z+ e
where Y represents real GDP, P population, INV investment per GDP, and Z a set of additional
determinants: Variance of unexpected inflation (Var(INF)), Money per GDP (M2), and Credit to
the Private Sector as a percentage of GDP (CPS). e is a residual.
log(Y(-1)/P(-1)) -0.109 -0.123 -0.135 -0.132
(0.015) (0.016) (0.018) (0.019)
INV/100 0.313 0.339 0.342 0.344
(0.041) (0.044) (0.045) (0.044)






R2 0.196 0.207 0.209 0.212
SSR 1.575 1.478 1.448 1.452
The sample is 1970-1997.  The estimation method is weighted LS with Fixed Effects estimates.
The sample consists of all 20 countries. Total number of observations is 444. White-
heteroskedasticity corrected standard errors are between parentheses. R2 represents the adjusted





The model estimated reads:
Log(Y(T)/P(T))-Log(Y((-1))/P(-1)) = a1 Log(Y(-1)/P(-1))) + a2 INV + a3 Z+ e
where Y represents real GDP, P population, INV investment per GDP, GCO is government
consumption as a percentage of GDP, and Z a set of additional determinants: Variance of
unexpected inflation (Var(INF)), Money per GDP (M2), and Credit to the Private Sector as a
percentage of GDP (CPS). e is a residual.
log(Y(-1)/P(-1)) -0.152 -0.174 -0.172 -0.177
(0.024) (0.025) (0.025) (0.027)
INV/100 0.390 0.431 0.415 0.429
(0.053) (0.058) (0.057) (0.058)
GCO/100  -0.363 -0.586 -0.528 -0.608
(0.122) (0.147) (0.151) (0.162)






R2 0.253 0.300 0.303 0.297
SSR 0.835 0.768 0.753 0.768
The sample is 1970-1997.  The estimation method is weighted LS with Fixed Effects estimates.
The sample consists of all 10 countries (Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central African Republic,
Chad, Congo, Cote d’Ivoire, Gabon, Niger, Senegal, and Togo). Total number of observations is
230. White-heteroskedasticity corrected standard errors are between parentheses. R2 represents





The model estimated reads:
Log(Y(T)/P(T))-Log(Y((-1))/P(-1)) = a1 Log(Y(-1)/P(-1))) + a2 INV + a3 Z+ e
where Y represents real GDP, P population, INV investment per GDP, GCO is government
consumption as a percentage of GDP, and Z a set of additional determinants: Variance of
unexpected inflation (Var(INF)), Money per GDP (M2), and Credit to the Private Sector as a
percentage of GDP (CPS). e is a residual.
log(Y(-1)/P(-1)) -0.053 -0.063 -0.082 -0.094
(0.018) (0.019) (0.025) (0.026)
INV/100 0.305 0.385 0.393 0.401
(0.071) (0.077) (0.078) (0.078)
GCO/100  0.001 -0.037 -0.045 -0.077
(0.004) (0.059) (0.060) (0.067)






R2 0.216 0.241 0.238 0.245
SSR 0.580 0.528 0.519 0.514
The sample is 1970-1997.  The estimation method is weighted LS with Fixed Effects estimates.
The sample consists of all 10 countries (Ethiopia, Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, Mauritania, Mauritius,
Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Sudan and Zaire). Total number of observations is 230. White-
heteroskedasticity corrected standard errors are between parentheses. R2 represents the adjusted






The model estimated reads:
Log(Y(T)/P(T))-Log(Y((-1))/P(-1)) = a1 Log(Y(-1)/P(-1))) + a2 INV + a3 Z+ e
where Y represents real GDP, P population, INV investment per GDP, GCO is government
consumption as a percentage of GDP, and Z a set of additional determinants: Variance of
unexpected inflation (Var(INF)), Money per GDP (M2), and Credit to the Private Sector as a











(0.052) (0.051) (0.069) (0.056)
INV/100 0.548 0.535 0.399 0.225
(0.095) (0.138) (0.120) (0.119)
Var(INF)*E-09  -0.267 -0.007 4.275 -0.615
(0.584) (0.018) (1.182) (0.311)
CPS/100 -0.012 -0.347 -0.019 0.003
(0.129) (0.181) (0.124) (0.115)
GCO/100 -1.196 0.187 -0.990 -0.154
(0.359) (0.175) (0.212) (0.189)
Countries 8 8 10 10
N 102 95 89 81
R2 0.389 0.358 0.422 0.583
SSR 0.398 0.243 0.159 0.113
The estimation method is weighted LS with Fixed Effects estimates. The sample consists of the
CFA (MU) and non-CFA-countries (see Tables 9 and 10 for the country names).  White-
heteroskedasticity corrected standard errors are between parentheses. N is the number of
observations. R2 represents the adjusted determination coefficient. SSR is the sum of squared
residuals.
